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Religion, Psychiatry, and Psychotherapy:  
Exploring the Japanese Experience and the Possibility of 
a Transnational Framework  
 
One of the major modern cultural themes shared across Asia and the West has been 
complex interchange between professionalizing and expanding ‘psy disciplines’ – 
principally psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy – and the thinkers, leaders, and 
laypeople of the world’s religions. Psy theories have been put forward to explain or to 
help ‘cure’ religious thinking, behaviour, and experiences or to sort doctrinal or 
ideological wheat from accumulated chaff; and psychotherapy has been widely touted 
as a distillation of the positive ‘functions’ of religion, into a form culturally 
acceptable to the disenchanted – helpfully systematized to meet the demands of busy 
people.  
Yet the coming together of religion and the psy disciplines since the latter half 
of the twentieth century – perhaps, recognizing the historical rootedness of the latter 
in the epistemologies and anthropologies of the former, we should talk of 
rapprochement – has been rather more ambiguous a process than straightforward 
secularization and the co-option of religious ideas and practices by science and 
medicine. Psy approaches to religion have been far from uniformly deconstructionist 
in intent and effect, nor have they developed in a vacuum of socio-economic and 
cultural concerns, not to mention governmental and personal interests. More 
generally, ‘religion’ has tended to be reshaped rather than displaced by, or absorbed 
into, cognate areas of human life and knowledge, from the psy disciplines to 
aesthetics and ethics.i In many forms of Christianity and Buddhism, for example, 
Freudian ideas have found themselves appropriated as part of a system of checks and 
balances that seeks to keep communal worship and private prayer or meditation as 
free as realistically possible of narcissism, inter-personal strife, counter-phobic 
strategies, and various forms of self-deception (Engler 2003). The Jungian 
contribution has been to highlight the continuing psycho-social necessity and 
potential of religious belief and praxis, while leaving open the question of their 
ultimate referent(s) (Palmer, 1997).  
Modern rationalizing approaches towards our global religious inheritance, 
then, in which the psy disciplines continue to play a significant role, do not look like 
resulting in the whole lot ending up on the bonfire any time soon – for all that this 
outcome was once expected, and in some quarters fervently hoped for. One might 
even argue that increasingly in the twenty-first century the idioms of the psy 
disciplines and the neurosciences are showing themselves to be little match for the 
raw symbolic and emotional power of religious stories, hopes, and intuitions when it 
comes to grasping and tackling existential concerns. At the same time religious 
individuals and institutions find they have more and more use for the insights of 
developmental, dynamic, and transpersonal psychology. Recent initiatives in the UK 
and Japan are bringing religion and spirituality more openly into psychiatry and into 
end of life care – most recently, this has been a feature of post-3/11 disaster relief care 
in Japan’s northern region of Tohoku (Taniyama 2012).  
Yet religion and the psy disciplines clearly do not always make happy or 
profitable bedfellows. The accelerating interchange between them since the 1950s and 
1960s was preceded by decades of mutual suspicion and even hostility, from worries 
that psychoanalysis and behaviourism undermined Judaeo-Christian conceptions of 
the human person to turf wars fought between religious and secular psy professionals 
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over everything from the education of children to what constituted healthy and 
unhealthy habits and emotions. Behind a phrase like ‘religion-psy dialogue’, then, 
lurk manifold complications, antagonisms (albeit sometimes creative ones), points of 
confusion, and instances of everything from governmental and cultic manipulation to 
the sort of cultural essentialism that remains a stubborn feature of commentary on 
countries such as India and Japan, both from without and within. Besides this, 
religious traditions and the psy disciplines are notable for their combination of all-
encompassing claims about the nature and destiny of the human person with the use 
of powerful language, imagery, and practices whose sometimes enigmatic nature 
many are willing to tolerate, as necessary or harmlessly characteristic, rather than 
probe for clarification. A vivid example of the potential perils of religion-psy dialogue 
was the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, perpetrated by members 
of Aum Shinrikyō – a group described by Tarutani Shigehiro as the ‘child of… pop 
psychology and Buddhism’ (Tarutani 2006).ii Aum was just one of hundreds of new 
religious movements to appear in Japan since the 1920s, many of which drew on 
traditional or folk religious ideas and healing practices combined with psychology and 
psychotherapy – frequently, as Shimazono Susumu has pointed out, in an attempt to 
fill the modern vacuum of agreed ethical standards by offering, as the next best thing, 
technical methods of self-mastery designed to provide a modicum of peace of mind 
(Shimazono 2004).iii 
There have been concerns too about the impact of the religion-psy encounter 
upon how people grow up learning to conceive of themselves, ‘as ideally and 
potentially certain sorts of person’ (Rose 1999: 11) – the psy disciplines having 
contributed to mainstream culture modes of self-reflection rooted in objectification 
and narrativization. There are political consequences to this, suggests Nikolas Rose, 
with traditional, external methods of governmental surveillance and coercion 
increasingly exchanged for more internalized forms: 
 
Through self-inspection, self-problematization, self-monitoring and confession, we 
evaluate ourselves according to the criteria provided for us by others. Through self-
reformation, therapy, and the calculated reshaping of speech and emotion, we adjust 
ourselves by means of the techniques propounded by experts of the soul. (Rose 1999: 
11) 
Broadly encompassing in its conceptual scope, deeply personal in its everyday reality, 
and phenomenologically complex – ideas and propositions blending with symbol, 
myth, emotion, faith, presumed unconscious content, and meditative states – the 
religion-psy dialogue seems to resist adequate description, critique, and evaluation via 
any single meta-language. Instead, the task of reflecting upon this dialogue, its 
intersection with broader social and cultural historians, and its potential future 
directions, is in part a matter of understanding the transnational, institutional, 
intellectual, and personal circumstances in which it has come about: tracing its impact 
and ambiguities as they have played out in practice – amongst practitioners, clients, 
and others – and thereby offering as a counterpoint to its sometimes rather totalizing 
claims a vivid sense of its sheer historical contingency and diverse possible futures. 
 How, though, to subject such a broad and potentially nebulous topic to critical 
analysis? The aim of this article is to offer an exploratory framework geared towards 
this purpose, divided into five parts and intended for use by historians, 
anthropologists, and those in allied disciplines whose work touches in some way upon 
modern interchange between religious concerns and those of psychiatry, 
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psychotherapy, and psychology. The five parts are based on an observation of 
historical and clinical literature in this area, and are intended thereby to be of use 
across a range of disciplines and professional concerns: history, anthropology, 
religious and cultural studies, and the psy disciplines. 
‘Religion-psy dialogue’ ought not to be understood as implying a conversation 
between imagined essentialisms of ‘religion’, ‘psychiatry’, etc. It is, rather, a case of 
instances of interaction between very specific ideas and practices, shaped by transient 
political and socio-cultural conditions and occurring in the personal and working lives 
of individual pioneers, patients, or clients. For this reason, our framework encourages 
us to look first, and at greatest length, at circumstances and orientations. The former 
is a matter of social and cultural context, the latter a more intimate exploration of the 
influences, motivations, emotions, thoughts, and beliefs of key people in whose inner 
and outer lives religious and psy ideas and practices came together. Our focus here 
will fall upon the Japanese context and Japan’s place in global transnational religion-
psy interactions. 
Only once we have established these specifics, probing people’s ‘orientations’ 
as closely as our source materials allow, do we take a step back and try to understand 
in more philosophical terms what the problems are that the religion-psy dialogue 
either creates or sets out to solve. These revolve primarily around the nature and fate 
of the human person, in at least four interrelated senses: first, her basic ontological 
and moral status; second, the relative value and potential for development of her 
various capacities, especially reflection and relationship; third, her socio-cultural and 
institutional status – as authority, expert, layperson, deviant, client, patient, etc; and 
finally, the personal and cultural implications where broad notions of weakness, 
sickness, and health become conceptual bridges between religious and psy frames of 
reference. ‘Human person’ is chosen here over and above the perhaps more familiar 
category of ‘personhood’ in order to provide two sorts of reminders: firstly, of the 
unique moral and ontological worth accorded by some religious traditions to 
humanity (irrespective of the more nuanced and possibly more demanding 
requirements of ‘personhood’); and second of the significant role played by 
humanistic philosophies and psychotherapy in religion-psy dialogue.  
Part four of the framework moves away from the philosophical content and 
implications of the religion-psy dialogue and examines the language in which it is 
conducted: the differing and often only awkwardly compatible registers that are used, 
from diagnostic categories to doctrine, metaphor to metaphysics, evaluative and 
functional modes of speech, autobiographical narrative to phenomenological thick 
description. The entrance into everyday thought and speech of psychological 
terminology, together with the epistemologies and models of human personhood and 
development that these terms encapsulate and help to diffuse, is a well-recognized 
feature of late twentieth-century culture in many parts of the modern world. A similar 
process is involved where the hybrid and re-formed concepts arising from religion-
psy dialogue is concerned: the use of language, the often covert epistemologies and 
ontologies that attend that use, and even the limits that are claimed for language when 
it comes to naming and transforming the inner life, rank amongst the most broadly 
influential aspects of religion-psy dialogue and as such require serious scrutiny.  
Part five of our framework offers one final angle of analysis: where do 
complementarities and antagonisms lie in the religion-psy dialogue? Often this is a 
matter of context-specific instances of what Thomas Gieryn has called ‘boundary 
work’: on-going contests over ideological and institutional prerogatives, especially 
when it comes to areas of life where multiple interests and forms of expertise are 
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involved. But it is also frequently the case that the coming together of religious with 
psy ideas forces practical and intellectual uncertainties out into the open: psychiatrists 
faced with patients claiming religious experiences find themselves having to probe the 
extent to which their judgments are value-laden, even where consensus opinion is so 
strong as to all but obscure this element in their work; religious professionals and 
laypeople presented with alternative vocabularies and narratives for their emotional 
lives are forced to ask questions about the relationship between metaphysical claims 
and psychological metaphor. A focus upon complementarities and antagonisms is 
designed to bring some of these doubts and difficulties out into the open, as part of 
assessing the content and implications of modern and on-going religion-psy dialogue. 
It is hoped that this framework may be of use to historians working across a 
range of geographical and cultural regions, beyond Japan and its relationships with 
western culture (which naturally limit us here to discussion of Buddhism and 
Christianity) and into regions where Islam’s encounter with psychiatry and 
psychotherapy is set to become a major concern in the years ahead. Of the many 
reasons why Japan is a challenging and illuminating starting point for building a 
model of the relationships between religion and the psy disciplines, two are worth 
mentioning here. First, Japan’s modernization process is rightly famed internationally 
for its rapidity, meaning that one can see across a span of relatively few years the 
influx and debate of an enormous number of new ideas. This compressed and highly 
self-conscious formation of new cultural and scientific milieux, around the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, allows us a view of how religion-psy 
relationships play out against a backdrop of what might at first appear unrelated 
political, social, and institutional concerns. Second, both Japanese themselves and 
interested outsiders have struggled over the decades to decide to what extent, and in 
what ways, Japan is a ‘religious’ society. The difficulties surrounding this question, 
which derive in part from the global cultural power of Western notions of ‘religion’, 
are creatively useful to us in our present endeavour: they remind us, in formulating 
our analysis of the religion-psy dialogue, that while the psy disciplines are obviously 
diverse and constantly evolving, ‘religion’ too is a moving target.  
 
Circumstances and Orientations 
 
We can divide the modern era in Japan into four phases, for our purposes here: the 
initial impact of Japan’s modernizing reforms and its interaction with western politics 
and culture, from the late nineteenth century through to the early 1910s; the rise, from 
the 1910s to the late 1940s, of psychotherapies inspired by new scientific and medical 
ideas but rooted in – or making strategic use of – traditional Japanese religious or 
cultural forms; Japan’s rebirth as a nation in the early 1950s and the renewed impact 
of western, particularly American, dynamic and developmental psychology; and 
finally a boom for new religious, spiritual, cultural, and psychotherapeutic discourses 
from the 1970s onwards – some cosmopolitan and outward looking, others echoing 
prewar concerns about the cohesion of Japanese society and culture; almost all of 
them concerned with offering alternative or corrective discourses and rationalities to 
the modernism of the previous period.  
All four periods have fed into present-day mental health priorities in Japan, 
including the provision of counselling in schools and universities, together with grief, 
terminal, and disaster care. And, crucially, in each of these four periods standards 
differed for what counts as legitimate and useful commentary upon the inner life and 
its problems and possibilities.  
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One of the most powerful forces shaping the first phase, from 1868 to the 1910s, was 
Japan’s predicament over how to cope effectively with the broad spectrum of ideas 
and institutions that come under the heading of ‘western modernity’: would Japanese 
culture be best preserved and developed by reinterpreting it according to western 
forms, or by revivifying indigenous categories?  
Japanese Buddhism was initially in a weak position here, linked to the power 
of the old regime and to what many saw as Japan’s historically weak polity and 
humiliating scientific and technological backwardness. The degeneration of the early 
Meiji government’s policy of shimbutsu bunri (the formal separation of Shinto and 
Buddhism, where previously they had shared religious sites) into haibutsu kishaku 
(the destruction of Buddhism) confirmed high levels of popular anger against the 
Buddhist establishment and heightened the sense that Buddhism was simply 
inconsistent with the aspirations of the new society that was taking shape.iv And yet 
pioneers of religion-psy dialogue in this era were able to tap into concerns about 
culture and idiom, and into related concerns about Japan’s need of a psychologically 
and morally robust population that would put the interests of the new nation first. 
Inoue Enryō, a Jōdo Shinshū Buddhist who studied philosophy at Tokyo University, 
made it his business to assert the central cultural and political importance in the new 
Japan of a Buddhism stripped of superstitious accretions and fully in tune with 
modern science – including the mind sciences. He pioneered the theorization and 
advocacy of ‘seishin ryōhō’, and insisted upon the complementarity of Buddhism 
with the most advanced ideas in western philosophy and natural sciences. Key to 
Inoue’s success was his ability to cultivate government and popular support for his 
assertions: seeking to demonstrate, for example, that psychology could help in ridding 
Japan of harmful superstitions, for which real Buddhism had no time and bore no 
responsibility.v He and his colleagues also realized that Japan’s new educational 
establishment, from high schools and their dormitories to the expanding university 
system, were key to the long-term legitimacy of religious ideas in the modern world. 
So it was that one of Inoue’s junior colleagues, the Buddhist priest Chikazumi Jōkan, 
became mentor to a young boy, Kosawa Heisaku, who just a few years later was 
blazing a trail as Japan’s first psychoanalyst – taking Sigmund Freud personally to 
task over his inadequate understanding of the importance of religion to the human 
inner life. 
Alongside modernizing Buddhists, the emerging shape of Japan’s psychiatric 
establishment – and its backing by government and the law – was crucial to the 
circumstances in which religion-psy interaction was to take shape. Of considerable 
future significance was its generally critical stance towards what were regarded as 
superstitions, folk beliefs, and outdated temple and shrine treatments for the mentally 
ill (albeit that some psychiatrists showed interest in their efficacy, despite their 
mistaken rationalesvi), as was its relative lack of interest in research and treatment 
geared towards psychological and emotional disturbance – this was due in part to the 
powerful influence of German neuropsychiatry via Erwin von Baelz and later the 
German-trained Kure Shūzō, both at Tokyo University. The fact that mainstream 
psychiatry took comparatively little interest in low-level emotional disorders, 
combined with the reticence of sufferers to seek help in this way – thanks to media 
hostility towards psychiatric care and the stubborn stigma (and serious legal 
implications) attaching to some psychiatric diagnosesvii – left the way open for 
innovative physical, dietary, and narrative therapies created by freelance individuals. 
These had the potential to become broadly influential, since as Suzuki Akihito has 
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pointed out legislation on mental illness and care – especially the 1900 Mental 
Patients’ Custody Act and the 1919 Mental Hospitals Act – tended towards codifying 
existing practices rather than imposing new ideals from above (Suzuki 2003: 224). In 
other words, there was plenty of social and cultural space in Japan for hybrid ideas 
and practices to flourish and gain traction – indeed, moving beyond the notion of 
‘hybridity’, there was plenty of room for the meaning of ‘religion’, the ‘human 
person’, and ‘mental health’ to be deeply and creatively contested. 
A powerful contributing orientation in this first phase was ‘self-cultivation’, 
which Janine Anderson Sawada has noted was ‘pervasive to the point of banality’ in 
nineteenth-century Japan – covering much of what in the West at the time was usually 
separated into ‘religion’, ‘morality’, ‘divination’, ‘health’, and ‘education’ (Sawada 
2004: 3). There was influence here from shugyō (self-strengthening through quasi-
ascetic practices), reinforcement via government initiatives and middle-class media, 
and complementarities with an orientation towards focusing upon the practical utility 
of ideas – most obviously in Fukuzawa Yukichi’s championing of jitsugaku, or 
‘practical learning’ (Sawada: 93). These two orientations – self-cultivation and 
pragmatism – meant that people such as Inoue Enryō and later Kosawa Heisaku 
brought to religion-psy dialogue an interest in practices, experiences, relationships, 
and efficacy – over and above concerns about how religious and psy ideas might be 
complementary or antagonistic at metaphysical or theoretical levels.  
 
A third orientation, carrying us from this first phase into the second (1910s – 1940s), 
was pervasive concern about what sorts of people, families, and relationships modern 
life was giving rise to in Japan – and in Japan’s big cities especially. Relational 
subjectivity – ‘being in relationship’ – seemed to be an ideal under threat, and in 
many areas of life there were attempts to restore it. Breathing exercises focused on an 
individual’s relationship with his or her physical and social environment; in politics, 
the notion of kokutai (the ‘national body’) gained prominence both as a metaphor for 
connections of mutual interest and responsibility promoted by political leaders and as 
a ‘larger self’ in the context of which Japanese people could find their identityviii; 
some of the earliest systems of psychotherapy focused, as we shall shortly see, on 
encouraging a restorative awareness of a person’s relationships with and debts to 
family members; and finally, at a philosophical level, there was interest in moving 
from dichotomous (either/or) thinking to a more unitive and inter-relational vision – 
most notably in Nishida Kitarō and his disciples within the Kyoto School of 
philosophy.ix  
In this context, religion seemed to offer something valuable to emerging psy 
ideas and therapies. Firstly, people associated religious institutions with conservative 
values, with historical memory, and also a kind of transhistorical reassurance about 
the goodness of life. It was a popular move to make both for psychiatrists and 
therapists like Morita Masatake (student of Kure Shūzō and developer of ‘Morita 
Therapy’) and for more commercially minded pioneers to blend three things in 
formulating and advertising new psychotherapeutic practices: social commentary (a 
favourite was to construe hyper-individualism and levels of neurasthenia as a sign of 
the strains of modern living); the latest scientific ideas, from physics to electricity to 
the mind sciences; and finally Buddhist metaphysics or Buddhist and Confucian 
values. Kuwabara Toshirō combined somewhat inflated claims for the healing powers 
of hypnotism – physical as well as psychological – with a quasi-religious account of 
how hypnotism worked, which owed much to modernized, pantheistic interpretations 
of Japanese Buddhism: he claimed that it brought the human psyche (seishin) into 
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tune with the greater universal seishin of which it was a part.x His three-volume 
Seishin Reidō (1903) became a bestseller.  
Secondly, religion provided powerful rhetorical and practical means of easing 
the situations of people whose emotional or psychological problems were a matter of 
falling out of relationship, somehow – with themselves, with others, with their times. 
Three of the most significant psychotherapeutic pioneers of mid-century Japan – two 
of them psychiatrists – drew on Buddhist tradition in addressing such problems. 
Morita Masatake systematized his treatment of his own and his colleagues’ 
neurasthenia in 1921, as The Treatment of Neurasthenia and Shinkeishitsu. Suffering 
arises, he said, from a natural disposition towards neurosis together with a mistaken 
popular and philosophical dualism that insists one part of the mind can be used to 
control the other to a significant degree. A person must relinquish these harmful 
attempts at cognitive control, and instead learn to live in relationship with Reality as it 
is [arugamama].xi Kosawa Heisaku, who trained in psychiatry with Marui Kiyoyasu 
at Tohoku University before pursuing psychoanalytic training in Vienna and returning 
to set up private practice in Tokyoxii, shared Morita’s prioritization of practice over 
theory and hoped personally to become the means, for each of his clients, by which 
the loving capacity of ‘Other power’ was realized to be working in their lives. This 
activity of ‘Other power’, which Kosawa associated with Jōdo Shinshū Buddhism’s 
tariki (advocacy of the saving potential of ‘other power’ as opposed to one’s own 
effort) and the person of Amida Buddha, was for him the core both of religion and of 
psychotherapeutic healing. It was a metanoetic moment brought about by a realized 
relationship, which Kosawa theorized for psy audiences in terms of mothers and sons 
(a variation on Freud’s Oedipus Complex that Kosawa called the ‘Ajase Complex’, 
after the Buddhist legend) but which was more profoundly about Amida and human 
beings. For Kosawa, the purely secular world lacked the language for understanding 
and the means for achieving this profound restoration of relationship, both to oneself 
and to Reality, while Japan’s ‘new religions’ offered only a manipulative and second-
rate approximation. The third individual to draw on Buddhism as an inspiration for a 
restored relational subjectivity was Yoshimoto Ishin, who began to develop 
Yoshimoto ‘Naikan’ therapy in the 1940s, and set about popularizing it after the war 
(see below). 
 
In the post-war context two of the most powerful contextual influences were new 
trends towards secularism and individual autonomy.xiii Kosawa’s student Doi Takeo 
was a Catholic convert, and so by no means hostile towards religion, but he objected 
to what he saw as his mentor’s heavily Buddhistic take on psychoanalysis – which 
involved an inappropriate degree of didacticism within the therapeutic context. Doi 
objected too towards what he felt was Kosawa’s overbearing attitude – mothering, 
almost smothering – and his seeking of the role of a messianic figure in a client’s life. 
Gone, or at least going, by the 1950s, was the kind of paternalism that allowed Morita 
to have a client stay in his home and do domestic chores as part of his therapy, or the 
psychoanalyst Ohtsuki Kenji to routinely invite clients to stay with him at his country 
home – taking long walks as Ohtsuki turned himself into the caring, receptive father 
the client had never had. Where once the influential hypnotist Kondō Yoshizō had 
claimed that for the practice to work the client ought to be intellectually and socially 
inferior to the practitioner (and indeed many male hypnotists claimed to prefer 
women and children as their subjects, on this basis), post-war individualism and 
psychotherapy in the Rogerian mould was establishing itself: a matter of nurturing 
and building upon a client’s own aspirations and resources.xiv 
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 Yoshimoto Ishin’s ‘Naikan therapy’ was shaped by this new mood, but was 
able somehow to operate at its borders. Yoshimoto was a member of the same 
Japanese Buddhist sect, Jōdo Shinshū, as Kosawa Heisaku, and worked to turn the 
practice of mishirabe, or ‘looking into oneself’ (in which a practitioner spends days in 
ascetic semi-isolation, meditating on his or her life, sins, and death, aided by 
occasional visits from senior practitioners) into something for people unmoved or 
even put off by religious contexts. The once-and-for-all experience of assurance about 
one’s salvation was shifted to a continual searching and self-reflection; participants 
were allowed food and sleep; introspection was guided along specific lines, with the 
aid of a guide; and one’s social and moral debts to others were emphasized over and 
above ideas about an afterlife (Shimazono, 1995). Yoshimoto opened his first 
dedicated ‘Naikan’ centre in 1953, and it was a testament both to the value of the 
practice and to Yoshimoto’s successful rebranding of it that Naikan was soon 
receiving the warm approval of clinicians and being offered in prisons and schools 
across Japan.  
 And yet both Naikan and Doi’s theory of amae included rather than entirely 
jettisoned the orientations and dilemmas of the past. What Kawahara Ryuzo says of 
Naikan holds too for the concept of amae: it addresses a cultural-familial situation in 
modern Japan whereby close interpersonal relationships, especially between mother 
and son, can give rise to overindulgence and unrealistic expectations about what and 
how the world at large will provide for people once they grow up (Kawahara 2005: 
190, 197). Both Yoshimoto and Doi tried to meet the people of their age where they 
were: requiring a clear break from the past, but still suffering many of the old 
problems. And though both Yoshimoto and Doi mostly eschewed the openly religious 
language of Kosawa and, to a lesser extent, Morita, religious concerns remained just 
below the surface of their activities. In the end, Yoshimoto turned his own home into 
a Buddhist temple and took Buddhist vows. He always maintained a belief in 
reincarnation. 
 
If anything, the fourth and final phase of religion-psy dialogue in modern Japan has 
been characterized by an intensification of these concerns about relationship and a 
willingness to characterize and tackle them as specifically ‘Japanese’. In part, this is 
the result of resurgent cultural confidence in Japan since the late 1960s, as Japan’s 
economy began to boom once again. The nihonjinron genre – with psychiatrists and 
psychotherapists like Doi playing a key role – catered for popular interest in Japan 
and abroad about the purported psychological and sociological ‘uniqueness’ of a 
miraculously resilient nation, while the transcultural psychiatry movement combined 
with international interest in the therapeutic wisdom of Japanese religious traditions to 
focus sympathetic attention on the phenomenology of religious mental states and the 
healing potential of religious and folk practices.xv From the 1970s and the early 2000s, 
respectively, there has been the rise of the ‘Spiritual World’ (seishin sekai) movement, 
making heavy use of psychotherapeutic models and practices, and of religious and 
spiritual forms of care for the grieving, the dying, and the disaster-afflicted. Kokoro 
naoshi (renewal of one’s heart or spirit), and especially – as Ueda Noriyuki has 
pointed out (Ueda 1997) – iyashi (healing) are two of the key conceptual entry points 
for religious traditions and organizations into psychiatry, psychotherapy, and care 
more generally.  
Shimazono Susumu has identified this as a shift from ‘salvation’ to ‘healing’, 
involving what he calls ‘psycho-religious composite movements’ (of which Naikan is 
one). But as we have seen, the orientation of religion-psy dialogue in modern Japan 
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has, since the early Meiji era, been towards cultivation, pragmatism, and relationship 
over and above the theoretical complementarity of traditional religious with newer 
physical, psychiatric, or psychotherapeutic thinking. Clearer shifts have occurred in 
how people understand authority, autonomy, and the nature of relationships: the shift 
towards the ‘spiritual’ in Japan, from the 1970s to the present day, has in part been a 
matter of tackling the same fundamental dilemmas as religion but doing so in a way 
that gives people greater autonomy and addresses more closely their everyday 
concerns. As Horie Norichika points out, supirichuaru in Japan has never been about 
‘spirit’ or transcendence in western Christian or post-Christian usages of the word; 
rather, it is about this-worldly action and virtue.xvi For Ioannis Gaitanidis, writing 
about the ‘spiritual business’ in Japan in recent years, this has meant both ‘the 
sacralization of the therapeutic and the commercialization of the sacred’ (Gaitanidis 
2011: 202).  
In a few cases, certain individuals or concerns have cut across the 
religious/spiritual, the psy, the civil, and the political, and have suggested ways in 
which they might collaborate in meeting the needs of contemporary Japanese people. 
The relief effort in the aftermath of 3/11 is an example of one major such concern, 
while the ‘spiritual intellectual’ par excellence, was of course Kawai Hayao. In a 
career that combined therapeutic care, education, institutional leadership in the psy 
disciplines, and cultural leadership at the national political level, Kawai showed 
people the value of the Japanese Buddhist and folk inheritance in understanding the 
psychological and existential questions that continue to press upon them in the early 
twentieth century.  
 
 
The Human Person  
 
Notably absent from the sketch of circumstances and orientations offered above are 
clients, patients, and religious communities. In order for this framework to be useful, 
one of the priorities for future research into religion-psy dialogue is to inquire into the 
experience of what we might call ‘psycho-religious laities’. Recent progress here is 
evident in sociological and anthropological work by Chikako Ozawa-de Silva and 
Horie Norichika, on Naikan and reincarnation narratives, respectively, and it is to be 
hoped that future work will prevent analysis of religious-psy dialogue from being 
hamstrung by a bias towards male social and professional elites. 
 One of the reasons this kind of research on psycho-religious laities is so 
important is that religion-psy dialogue has involved – and continues to involve – 
intimate questioning of the nature and status of the human person. Part three of our 
framework looks at who holds the power to lead and shape that conversation, and at 
how standards and prerogatives for expertise and authority come to be understood. 
The religion-psy dialogue has to a large extent been about what we do with our 
capacity to reflect upon ourselves as human beings: how we objectify, evaluate, and 
tell stories about ourselves. This has been a core activity in various of the world’s 
great religious traditions for millennia, but the rise of the psy disciplines has given 
renewed encouragement and cultural legitimacy to the process, and has supplied a 
wide range of new models and narratives where human personhood is concerned.  
There are instances of religious organizations rejecting out of hand any and all 
psy models and insights when it comes to the human person – examples of which 
appear in work on psychology and American Christian culture by Robert Kugelmann 
(2011) and by Eric L. Johnson (2010). More commonly, however, points of contact 
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are found and emphasized, while divergent core assumptions remain about what 
human beings most fundamentally ‘are’. Are human beings most fundamentally 
biological entities? In K.W. Fulford’s words, ‘object[s] governed by natural law, 
different only in degree of complexity from simple mechanical objects… in principle 
predictable… and subject to the same laws as anything else in nature’ (Fulford 1996)? 
Or are we more essentially socio-cultural beings, with biology offering a substrate or 
a ‘means’ whose determining power is easily over-stated? Are human beings, in the 
final analysis, a spiritual or semi-divine phenomenon with an essence or potential that 
is given rather than accidental or evolutionary or purely social – are we a part, or a 
transient manifestation, of greater spiritual or divine being?  
For John Polkinghorne (1986) all such framings of human being are ‘true… 
and all mysteriously cohere in [each] person’. But this ‘coherence’ is often imperfect: 
a framing that is for one person the core definition of humanity may be, for another, a 
colourful metaphor or a useful, therapeutic fiction. It is important to unpack such 
situations to seek out the ideas and politics at play. It may help us discover, for 
example, why Sigmund Freud never responded to the thesis on the Ajase Complex 
that Kosawa Heisaku handed him during his stay in Europe. One of the sticking points 
for Freud may well have been that Kosawa’s Buddhism and Freud’s theory worked 
with two visions of the human person that were simply impossible to reconcile. For 
Freud, personhood was a closed system, a matter of biological drives whose outcomes 
were socially shaped. Deities and their intentions, compassion, or love were simply 
not part of the picture, except as human psychological content. Another problem for 
Freud may have been the ego: a passing, useful phenomenon for a Buddhist like 
Kosawa – the vehicle for self-transcendence – but for Freud the crux of personal 
autonomy, to be given all possible assistance in its attempts to manage the demands of 
id and superego. 
 
Following on from what humans beings ‘are’ comes what human beings ‘do’. How 
are we to judge the reliability, relative value, and need for restraint or development of 
our various capacities? Amongst the most intimate of these are immediate 
phenomenological experience and our interpretation of it, giving rise both to acute 
and to longer-term questions. In the former case, philosophers of psychiatry have 
struggled to find ways in which visual or aural hallucinations can be interpreted 
without risking, on the one hand, the health and safety of patients and those around 
them and, on the other, the principle of not pathologizing that which is claimed to be 
religious, spiritual, or otherwise normal for a given person and his cultural milieu. 
Mike Jackson and K.W. Fulford have asked how psychotic experience might be 
separated out, for practical purposes in the clinical context, between spiritual and 
psychopathological (Jackson & Fulford 1997). Potential solutions include: a detailed 
psychopathological interview, so as to understand broad context and separate out 
form from content in patients’ experiences (form being the more significant for 
diagnostic purposes) (Sims 1997); focus upon causation or fruits of these experiences 
(thinkers as far back as William James argued that truly religious experiences could 
be known by their fruits in everyday life); exploration of the values and beliefs held 
by the patient, and whether the acute experiences in question are consistent with 
them; and inviting families and cultural or sub-cultural communities to contribute to 
the process of interpretation of a person’s experience.xvii  
Roland Littlewood has suggested, however, that most of these proposed 
solutions to a classic clinical religion-psy dilemma are based on a fallacy. ‘Spiritual’ 
and ‘psychopathological’ are not distinct ontological categories, he argues. No 
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psychophysical phenomenon could intrinsically possess the quality of being spiritual 
or psychopathological: these are attributions, made by clinicians or clerics seeking to 
impose clarity and order. Even categories like ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious worldview’ 
have been shown to be products of late Christianity – and students of the Japanese 
context will know just how contested these have been from the Meiji era onwards.xviii 
Related cautions about a simple religion-psy dichotomization of human experiences 
have been raised by Caroline Brett and by Marek Marzanski and Mark Bratton. Brett 
has shown how the phenomenology of some supposedly psychopathological states is 
remarkably close to what, in Mahayana Buddhist tradition (amongst others), is a 
healthy apprehension of the world – one in which the fiction of the self as a unitary 
agent has been abandoned. Marzanski and Bratton argue that the attribution of 
‘spiritual’ versus ‘psychopathological’ is made profoundly difficult by the prevalence 
and high valuation of asceticism in a number of religious traditions, including 
Christianity. Where some experts may propose – and indeed the terms of the DSM 
seem to imply this – that a religious or spiritual experience (as opposed to a 
psychopathological one) will involve unchanged or improved functioning, in fact 
progress in the religious life can often look, from the outside, as though everything is 
falling apart.xix 
Dilemmas concerning the long-term interpretation of human experience tend 
to bring psychotherapists into debates about religion and spirituality, encompassing 
affective and behavioural change alongside relationships to others and the world in 
general. It is only relatively recently that non-religious psychotherapists and 
counsellors in the West, Japan, and elsewhere have begun to be prepared to address 
religious and spiritual issues in the therapeutic context.xx Agneta Schreurs (2006a) has 
suggested that psychotherapists who lack confidence or experience of spiritual 
matters can use their training in relational dynamics to help clients make sense of 
their experiences. There are, she says, ‘important structural similarities between 
human relationships and the relational aspects of the divine’. A key example of this is 
where a patient, once he is convinced (once he experiences) that he is truly loved by 
God, is able ‘to look at himself with loving eyes’. This in turn allows for relationships 
with other people to be renewed. Of crucial import here, says Schreurs, is that in the 
Christian tradition a relationship with a personal God is supposed to change over 
time, just as a human one does – with various projections and illusions being laid 
aside as something more intimate and true develops. Therapists may also be able to 
discern the deep structure of someone’s spirituality or ‘personal theology’, helping 
them to see how parts of it have been garnered from elements of what they have been 
taught and from their life experience. They may also be able to use a patient’s 
religious/spiritual frame of reference as a source of energy for positive 
transformation.xxi 
Schreurs is here building upon one of the most important movements within 
religion-psy dialogue in the second half of the twentieth century: the relational turn. 
From object-relations within psychoanalysis (especially the work of Donald 
Winnicott on ‘transitional’ objects and phenomena, and the use made of it by 
religious and spiritual thinkers) to Alan Watts’ interpretations of Asian philosophical 
traditionsxxii much has been made of the therapeutic and spiritual implications of 
moving beyond positing humans as social animals to framing human selfhood at its 
most fundamental as relational – spanning the biochemical, socio-cultural, 
intrapsychic, interpersonal, and the spiritual. Schreurs’ work is just one example of 
how relationality has become a major conceptual and practical bridge between 
religion and the psy disciplines.  
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Besides what human persons ‘are and ‘do’, our framework points attention too 
towards the ‘person’ in social and cultural context: as authority figure, expert, patient, 
client, or religious layperson. What sorts of criteria emerge in the course of religion-
psy dialogue by which expertise and legitimacy – moral and cultural – come to be 
understood? In many economically advanced modern societies one could posit a 
double shift from religious towards secular psychological and psychiatric forms of 
authority where the human inner life is concerned, and more gradually of power 
passing from traditional elites to laities, clients, patients, consumers, and advocacy 
groups – this is partly what has defined the transition, in modern Japan, from 
traditional to modernist forms of religionxxiii and then from the religious to the 
‘spiritual’: the social and intellectual freedom and economic power with which 
ordinary people increasingly meet life’s existential and everyday problems.xxiv  
But though this shift is detectable in religion-psy contexts, expertise and 
legitimacy have also turned upon the ability of key individuals to embody the 
critiques of society or the claims about the human person that they make. Partly, of 
course, this is due to the intimacy of the subject matter: inevitably, the therapist or 
thinker does not merely possess and objectively transmit a message here – they and 
their lives are the message, to some extent. But it is also a matter of religion-psy 
interaction creating conditions where conventional expertise is lopsided: few 
individuals have possessed strong educational and professional credentials spanning 
equally the worlds of religion and any particular psy discipline, nor are they familiar 
with the basic standards by which beliefs and practices are evaluated across all the 
worlds in which they desire to operate (though this is changing in recent years, with 
genuinely dual expertise becoming more common). As Alasdair MacIntyre has 
pointed out, this is a difficult hermeneutic situation to escape, and it is hard not to 
judge the beliefs and practices of one tradition (no matter how much enthusiasm one 
has for it) according to the standards of the tradition with which one is most familiar. 
Psychiatrists or psychotherapists, for example, might tend towards viewing religious 
belief or community membership through the lens of physical and mental health 
benefits – in a way that perhaps takes insufficient account of the cautions offered by 
Marzanski and Bratton, above. 
 
A final dimension to these questions about the social and cultural status of the person 
concerns the use of notions of health, sickness, and weakness as metaphors in the 
religious and spiritual life and as conceptual bridges to the language of psychiatry and 
psychotherapy. This leads us to the penultimate section of our framework: language. 
 
 
Language 
 
A key feature of the religion-psy dialogue, and the one through which it exerts the 
greatest influence on mainstream culture, is its complex and creative use of language. 
The worlds of both religion and psy are concerned in large part with people’s 
experience of inchoate, shifting ‘inner lives’ and their subtle, intuitive contextualizing 
of these – projecting them back into the past via memory and narrative, into the future 
through hope and promise of change, and outwards into relationship with nature, with 
others, and (for many) with the divine. The limits of language in all this has been a 
matter of serious argumentation in any number of religious and psy contexts: the 
balance between reasonably literal representation and metaphorical or allegorical 
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indication; the importance of evocation, or expressions of faith or hope; the nature 
and value of diagnostic categories; the way that language acts as a vehicle for our 
interpretations and our epistemologies – not always in a way that makes them explicit; 
and the potential for language to channel our imaginations and our emotions.  
When the precision and stability with which words are moored to their objects 
is already in doubt, in this way, the bringing of these two worlds – religion and psy – 
into dialogue with one other has the potential either to clarify the role of language in 
particular contexts or to compound existing confusions and difficulties. In the latter 
case, one risk is of a heavily psychologized spirituality, where it is difficult – perhaps 
even taboo – to say what one thinks or believes about oneself or the world. An almost 
exclusive focus is placed instead upon individual growth, construed in a completely 
open and relativistic way using language gleaned from developmental psychology. 
There is a concomitant lack – critics would say – of commitment to intellectual rigour 
or to social justice, since it becomes impossible or unimportant to distinguish (and act 
upon) differences between right and wrong, fair and unfair. Or else a heavily 
spiritualized psychology results, where spiritual, religious, or otherwise grandly 
existential language makes its way into the consulting or counselling room, and 
distinctions between illness and health are downplayed in favour of talk about 
creativity and breakthroughs. 
 It is only possible here to scratch the surface of this feature of religion-psy 
dialogue, by looking at four basic sorts of language use. These are not intended as 
exhaustive. The point is to suggest that a typology of language use is a helpful way of 
achieving critical distance from the (often rather rich and attractive) rhetoric of a 
particular form of religion-psy interaction, and drilling down to find out what is being 
claimed – about the world and about the human person – and why. As we shall see, 
part of the usefulness of this sort of analysis lies in exploring where there are overlaps 
between different sorts of language use, or else contest or lack of clarify over how 
language is being used. 
One of the pitfalls to avoid, as we go, is assuming a general modern transition 
from the literal to the psychological or metaphorical use of religious language. Firstly, 
this dramatically misunderstands the rich, non-literal uses of language in religious 
contexts going back millennia, from cosmos-crafting Sanskrit and the gradual 
unfolding of understanding made possible by Buddhist texts and prayer practices to 
manifold traditions of interpretation within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
Secondly, by simply assuming this shift to have happened we obscure the politics of 
why and how. As Herbert Fingarette has pointed out, the psychologization of religion 
hasn’t just been a matter of reinterpreting one set of ideas in terms of another, more 
acceptable set. It has been a political and moral effort to undermine the very reality of 
that which is not (or cannot be made) public: here, religion is part of the inner realm, 
while the psy disciplines deal with shared, public concepts and standards.xxv  
 The first basic sort of language use is the ‘substantive-factual’. These are of a 
philosophically realist, correspondence-theory sort, asserting the independent reality 
of an entity or an essence – from the existence or non-existence of a divine to 
processes of psychiatric classification. In both cases, there is much debate about 
whether substantive-factual claims can really be made. Philosophers of psychiatry 
including K.W. Fulford, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton have argued that 
even in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM), which aims to be scientifically factual, there is somewhat covert reliance on 
our second sort of language use: evaluative. One of the criteria for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, for instance, is that a person’s functioning in a social or occupational 
 14 
context is ‘worse’ than it was before. Although in some cases family and psy 
professionals may witness a deterioration so profound as to leave little room for 
debate, there are cases – thinking back to our discussion about people having religious 
visions, for example – where the language of ‘better’ or ‘worse’ social functioning is 
revealed as quite clearly evaluative. Here, the consequences of interpreting and 
naming someone’s experiences can be momentous – the difference, perhaps, between 
receiving and not receiving a diagnosis as schizophrenic (Fulford & Stanghellini 
2008: 8).xxvi
 
Thornton further cautions, however, against the making of a simple ‘fact-
value’ distinction. In an example of how language can carry embedded within it 
ontological or epistemological assumptions that we may accept without having first 
fully noticed and processed, Thornton notes that a fact-value distinction rests on a 
certain view of reality: as a natural order that ‘individuates itself independently of 
what we know about it’ (and of values that we apply to it (Thornton 2002). This is by 
no means an unproblematic view of reality, and it shows how important it is to 
properly deconstruct the sort of language that religion-psy uses and promotes.
 
A third sort of language use is ‘functional’: fulfilling a context-specific 
function rather than stating literal truths or putting forward particular values. This 
could include forms of words intended – in and of themselves, and through the way 
they are communicated – to demonstrate, evoke, or indicate something whose direct 
statement is either not possible or would not have the desired effect. Myth falls into 
this category, as might a lapse from words into meaningful silence in the counselling 
room. Within clinical psychiatry, the argument is sometimes made that mental 
disorders do not ‘exist’ in the world as such, but rather psychiatric nosology is 
functional: creating categories based on common patterns seen across patients, which 
aid the work of doctors in prescribing medication or courses of treatment, while at the 
same time giving patients a useful point of reference – an easy means of approximate 
comparison with the experience of others (Broome 2006: 312).
 
Similarly, in 
psychotherapeutic contexts, ‘functional’ religious or spiritual claims or comments 
would be those designed to give meaningful shape to clients’ experiences and so 
create the conditions for forgiveness or acceptance or for some alleviation of guilt or 
anxiety. The question of whether there might be something substantive to these claims 
might well be suspended, as a matter of counselling-room ethics, or – as was the case 
in Carl Jung’s work – because the psychological is regarded as related to the divine, 
but not in ways that human beings are able usefully to encapsulate in words. 
Religious traditions of course make heavy use of functional claims that are 
tailored to the education, social and moral situation, and degree of spiritual insight of 
the person or the group concerned. Mahayana Buddhism’s concept of upaya – skillful 
or expedient means – is an obvious example, emerging from an Indian religious 
tradition where salvation is in large part a matter of the individual’s immediate 
consciousness of herself and the world. As a consequence of comparative religious 
studies since the late nineteenth century, modern and postmodern epistemologies, and 
the religion-psy dialogue, the proportion of religious language popularly understood 
as ‘functional’ – or at least as incorporating a functional role (inspiring faith, 
openness, moral growth) – has increased considerably. John Macquarrie has shown 
how Christian understandings of Jesus of Nazareth have changed across time, in 
relation to shifting cultural and philosophical contexts. And in regions of the world 
like India and Japan, we see a process whereby the ‘modernization’ or revival of 
indigenous religious traditions involved a series of decisions about which aspects of 
Brahminical Hinduism or the teachings of various Japanese Buddhist sects were to be 
regarded as substantive-factual statements about the world or the human condition, 
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and which were at best functional in some way (and at worst superstitious and 
outdated).  
The fourth and final sort of language use is the ‘performative’ claim or 
utterance, in the sense developed by J.L. Austin (1962), Ludwig Wittgenstein, and 
other philosophers of language. Here, the making of a claim is the doing of a certain 
kind of action. The simple statement to another person, ‘I believe in you’, could have, 
in this context, both a substantive and a performative element: it describes a feature of 
one’s relationship to that person, and at the same time serves to reaffirm this state of 
affairs both to the speaker and the listener. If we alter the phrase to ‘I believe in God’, 
the substantive element is rendered less clear because of the limits of language when 
it comes to the divine (perhaps alongside other forms of uncertainty), and instead the 
performative element is dominant: expressing, enhancing, perhaps advertising one’s 
devotion. In Japanese Shin Buddhism the short nembutsu prayer is very much a 
performative act rather than a substantive theological statement – in part because Jōdo 
Shinshū Buddhism is premised upon humankind’s meagre ability accurately to 
conceptualize or influence reality.  
 
 
The balance of substantive and performative in a given claim is not always easy to 
determine. In different forms of religion-psy interaction one sees both an attempt to 
articulate the importance of blending the substantive-factual with the performative: in 
calls, from Thomas Keating in the Catholic tradition to the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan 
Buddhist tradition, for people to balance head (rational, substantive-factual) with 
body and heart (emotional, performative). But one sees too a lack of clarity about the 
make-up of this blend – put bluntly, whether in most modern forms of psychologized 
spirituality anything very much is at stake by way of metaphysics or ethics. 
If key thinkers have helped drive the balance of these four basic uses of 
language in the religion-psy dialogue, this is partly because they emerged in historical 
contexts where epistemologies and uses of language were already in flux. The result 
was often considerable uncertainty over what language was ‘doing’ in any given 
situation. One can find amongst modernizing adherents of Japan’s Jōdo Shinshū (True 
Pureland) sect at the turn of the twentieth century those who treated talk of the ‘Pure 
Land’ as objectively literal and those who understood it as a functional approximation 
of a state of being that resists ordinary description. This is an old controversy, rooted 
as much in the constraints of dualistic human thinking as in anything identifiably 
‘modern’, but what is remarkable here is its survival into the modern era. If Inoue 
Enryō represents trends towards the metaphorization of religious language, partly in 
the interests of its compatibility with bio-medicine and the psy disciplines, then 
Chikazumi Jōkan represents almost its antithesis: a willingness to understand talk of 
the Pure Land and Amida Buddha in straightforwardly substantive-factual terms.  
Flux of this sort, in people’s epistemologies and expectations for what 
language does, has created opportunities as well as problems for religion-psy 
dialogue. It is at the level of shared or similar metaphors – of inner/outer, of growth or 
becoming, of ‘other’ or resistance – that religious systems are made intelligible to 
(and usable by) psychotherapeutic experts and laities, and vice versa where 
psychotherapeutic systems are concerned. As our discussion of circumstances and 
orientations showed, some of these shared metaphors have their origins outside of 
religion or the psy disciplines – in popular scientific ideas or pieces of imagery from a 
given period, from the conservation of energy to hydraulics and mechanical cause-
and-effect. Despite their obvious utility, they may quickly become outdated and even 
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unintelligible – as new generations emerge requiring the metaphorization of difficult 
or nebulous concepts in terms of computer processing or interconnectivity. In this 
way, instances of religion-psy dialogue may become relics, confusing or skewing the 
way in which people imagine themselves. Here, proper historicization and sound 
analysis of language use may help to restore a degree of clarity.   
 
 
Complementarities and Antagonisms  
The discussion so far has highlighted a number of complementarities and 
antagonisms. But by way of concluding this framework, and this article, it may be 
useful briefly to look at four major areas in which complementarities and antagonisms 
have arisen within the religion-psy dialogue and continue to be a central feature. 
 Firstly, as we saw from our survey of circumstance and objectives, 
institutional power and ideological influence is a major area of interest for analysts of 
religion-psy interaction in the modern world. One of the earliest concerns about the ps 
disciplines in Western religious circles was that they were thoroughly secular in 
character. As such, they threatened to wrest from religious institutions the cultural 
authority to talk about – and to educate children and the wider public – in the 
fundamentals of human nature and personhood. Psychoanalysis and behaviourism 
were seen as particularly secular and reductive, but even the humanistic psychology 
of the 1950s and 1960s had its religious detractors: nondirective (later ‘client-
centred’) counselling posited a basically good, value-giving, ‘feeling self’, which 
seemed at odds with the ‘prudent, reasoning, judging, perceiving’ (and deeply 
corrupt) human nature of Catholic scholastic and neo-scholastic theology, subject to a 
universal and objective morality rather than its author. An equally strong position was 
taken by some psy professionals, in whose client notes was to be found – so they 
claimed – irrefutable proof that religious institutions and ideas were powerfully 
psychopathogenic, lumbering people with tremendous amounts of guilt and neurotic 
anxiety. Again, circumstances matter: there was a mid-twentieth century 
psychoanalytic militancy here – and arguably a lack of subtlety – that neither 
Sigmund Freud before nor the likes of Wilfred Bion and Donald Winnicott after 
shared.xxvii  
Since the 1970s there has been a more considered staking out of the territory 
that religious and psy institutions appear to share. Complementarities have been 
found, though the basic antagonisms that fuelled the earlier period have not entirely 
gone away. An important complementarity, recognized increasingly in recent 
decades, is that psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy are outgrowths rather than 
the revolutionary overthrow of caring, pastoral activities formerly carried out within 
families and communities (including religious communities). This being so, 
innovations in the psy disciplines may occasionally be a matter of bringing to our 
attention elements of religious wisdom that have been lost or forgotten in recent years 
or even centuries, or which may have been neglected in the particular way in which 
people were educated or socialized into Christian or other religious communities. It 
was appreciated relatively early on by the likes of Frank Lake, the pioneer of ‘clinical 
theology’ who was inspired in his work by the lack of attention to mental healthcare 
in the missionary milieu in India, that good psychotherapy or counselling could 
balance out emotional or even moral failings in a person’s religious upbringing – 
Lake talked, for example, about dealing with ‘hardening of the oughteries’.  
Similarly, the clinical charting and theorizing of behavioural traits and 
problems in human beings, from Freud and Jung onwards, has been seen as 
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potentially a valuable resource for religious organizations: helping their leaders and 
members to gain insight into personality or behavioural patterns that may frustrate the 
living of a religious life – from wishful thinking and avoidance to narcissism and the 
need for a powerful father figure.  
 
A second major focus for complementarities and antagonisms has been the human 
person or ‘self’. Psychotherapy has been criticized as having the reification of this 
individual self as not just part of its strategy but as its core assumption. You cannot 
have psychotherapy, so the argument goes, except by accepting the ontological and 
moral primacy of the individual, and yet this is something with which religious 
traditions from Buddhism to Christianity would have great ontological and moral 
difficulty – emphasizing instead createdness and dependency, alongside the illusory 
and dangerous nature of conventional me-centred forms of perception. This is, 
however, to reduce the ‘psy disciplines’ to person-centred psychotherapy, when in 
fact new understandings of personhood and agency within the psy disciplines, such as 
embodied cognition, are starting to offer a corrective to psychoanalytic and 
humanistic framings of human personhood.  
 A related antagonism is the confusion, as a pioneer of modern contemplative 
Christianity, John Main, put it, of confusing religious or spiritual insight with self-
insight (Main 2007). This is not a matter of imagining the ‘religious/spiritual’ and the 
‘psychological’ to be somehow two separate parts of us, such that we confuse insight 
into one with insight into the other. Rather, ‘psychological’ insight operates on the 
plane where we construe immediate experience in terms of a unitary being with its 
own agency, whereas ‘spiritual’ insight is a matter of looking beyond that – 
interpreting the same immediate experience in a fundamentally broader sense. This is 
why for some, talk of a ‘true self’ – a powerful neologism of the religion-psy dialogue 
– is unhelpful in religious or spiritual terms: it encourages an over-identification of 
immediate experience with this unitary being, whose reality in fact has only a limited 
depth. 
 
There is room, however, for complementarity here. Jack Engler (2003) 
distinguishes between an ontological self and a psychological self. In his reading of 
the complementarity between Buddhism and psychoanalysis, it is necessary to have a 
healthy psychological self (the achievement of which is, loosely speaking, the terrain 
of the psy disciplines) in order to realize and cope with the fact that there is no 
ontological self undergirding this psychological self (a truth that Buddhism claims 
and helps to reveal). In the Japanese context, we see Morita and Yoshimoto in 
particular seeking to restore to their clients a sense of selfhood, and yet one that is 
fundamentally relational. Similar complementarities, for the exploration of which 
there is little space left here, exist when it comes to understanding human phenomena 
such as weakness or guilt or forgiveness: while religious and psy systems might not 
meet perfectly when it comes to understanding the ultimate sources of these, when it 
comes to the ways in which they are expressed and can be addressed in everyday life 
there is much useful common ground. The Christian theologian, Paul Tillich, who had 
extensive discussions with Carl Rogers, suggested that the therapist is really the 
vehicle rather than the source of forgiveness – but a very powerful and effective 
vehicle indeed.xxviii 
  
A third major area concerns our aspirations and commitments. Religion and the psy 
disciplines share a great deal here, working towards discernment, growth, maturity, 
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and hope in the face of the unknown. There is great potential for religion and the psy 
disciplines to come together in the work of discernment: helping to discern neurotic 
from existential anxiety, to draw boundaries between reasonable and excessive 
feelings of guilt, or to probe distorted images of the divine. Where growth is 
concerned, there are useful practical parallels between psychological models of 
development from infancy to maturity and models of progress in the religious or 
spiritual life. 
 There can be a tension, however, between shared aspirations and shaped 
aspirations. This brings us to our final area of focus, for complementarities and 
antagonisms in the religion-psy dialogue, and perhaps a fitting end to this article. 
Does it tend towards broadening our imaginative horizons, by opening up new 
questions and new means of exploration of the inner life? Do religious and psy 
vocabularies creatively triangulate rather than reductively refer – in the Buddhist 
image of the finger pointing at the moon, do they offer an extra finger or two, to help 
people on their way? Or, on the other hand, does religion-psy interaction tend more to 
narrow or ossify our vision of the world, encouraging us to shy away from difficult 
speculations or commitments? Does religion-psy dialogue run the risk of becoming 
what Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp (2011) have called an ‘immunization strategy’ 
– a means by which people sidestep daunting metaphysical or ethical questions?  
 
* 
 
There are no single answers to such questions because, as the early sections of this 
article tried to show, there is no single ‘religion-psy dialogue’ but only a series of 
context-specific conversations. This article has tried to show why such conversations 
are worthy of our attention, and why and how we might want to examine them. They 
are culturally and ideologically rich, in and of themselves, but they are also politically 
significant and possess the potential to influence profoundly how as human beings we 
imagine and think about ourselves. In short, a pairing as powerful as religion and the 
psy disciplines demands our careful attention, and looks set to do so for decades to 
come. 
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illness, from traditional religious and folk to biomedical models. See Hashimoto (2012). 
vii The Japanese state made manic-depression, for example, a basis for legal incompetence. Kitanaka 
(2011).  
viii See Doak (2007). 
ix See Heisig (2001) and Sharf (1993). 
x See Yoshinaga (2004). 
xi See Kondo Kyoichi & Kitanishi Kenji (1990). 
xii See Harding (2013). 
xiii See Koschmann (1981). 
xiv See Sato (2007) and Sato & Mizoguchi (1997). 
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xv See Shiotsuki (2007). On western interest in the therapeutic value of Japanese religious traditions see 
the work of Alan Watts, D.T. Suzuki, and Erich Fromm (the last two forming part of a collaboration to 
produce the book, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis in 1960). 
xvi See Horie (2009). 
xvii See Rashed (2010). 
xviii See Littlewood (1997). 
xix See Marzanski & Bratton (2002), especially the case studies of ‘Carol’ and ‘Peter’. 
xx For a survey, from a western point of view, see Gubi (2008). 
xxi See Psychotherapy and Spirituality: Integrating the Spiritual Dimension into Therapeutic Practice, 
2001. See also Schreurs 2006b. 
xxii See, for example, Watts (1961). 
xxiii See Janine Anderson Sawada on the non-institutional lay practice of Buddhism (zaike bukkyō) and 
Inagita Kōsen’s revival of koji Zen (lay engagement in Zen koan and meditation. Here we see an 
empowerment of religious laities: newly cash-strapped religious institutions, particularly Buddhist ones 
in the wake of government confiscation of property; and contemplative or reflective religious practices 
playing a role in respectable middle-class culture – often bound up with professional or commercial 
statuses and ties. Sawada (2004). 
xxiv See Gaitanidis (2011). 
xxv See Fingarette (1963). 
xxvi See also Jackson and Fulford (1997) on the problem of distinguishing spiritual from pathological 
forms of psychotic phenomena. 
xxvii On an Indian Christian‘s encounter with the psychoanalyst Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, see Harding 
(2011). 
xxviii See Cooper (2005). 
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